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BOOK REVIEW
A review of

LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR

MOVEMENT.

by William E. Forbath.
Cambridge, MA/London:

Harvard University Press (1991)
Pp. 211.

Reviewed by Russell Hollander'
For decades, labor historians have sought to explain the
"uniqueness" of the American Labor movement. "America's labor
laws provide far fewer [statutory] protections against exploitation,
injury, illness, and unemployment than the laws of the dozen other
leading Western industrial nations. "' Unlike employers in these other
nations, an American employer can discharge a non-union employee
for refusing to attend employer-sponsored prayer sessions,2 for being

homosexual, 3 or for refusing to drive uninspected trucks.4 Moreover,
0 Copyright 1994 by the New York Law School Journalof Human Rights.
Attorney, Cohen, Weiss & Simon, New York, New York; Member, American
Bar Association (Section on Labor & Employees Law); Member, New York State Bar
Association (Section of Labor Relations); Contributing Editor, The Railway Labor Act
(forthcoming); Adjunct professor, State University of New York, College of Old
Westbury (Labor Studies); J.D., cum laude, Harvard Law School, 1988; B.S., Cornell
University, 1985.
1 WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 1 (1991).

2 See Kolodziej v. Smith, 588 N.E.2d 634 (Mass. 1992); Court Finds No First
Amendment Violation in Mandatory Seminars with Religious Bent, DAILY LAB. REP.,
Apr. 8, 1992, at A-3 (reporting that mandatory seminars with religious overtones did not
violate employees' First Amendment rights because the employer did not inhibit
employees from practicing their religious faith). But see EEOC v. Townley Eng'g &
Mfg., 859 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that requirement that employer
accommodate employee's religion objections to devotional services by excusing him from
attendance would cause no undue hardship).
' See Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm., 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); Coretta King Endorses Gay Rights Bill, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, June 24, 1994, at 6; Workplace DiscriminationBill Gets Support, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 24, 1994, at 11; Civil Rights Chief Patrick Speaks His
Mind, LEGAL TIMES, May 30, 1994, at 9.
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the few statutory protections that exist exclude a large percentage of
the American labor force. For instance, the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act exclude more
than twenty-five percent of the American work force, 5 the
unemployment insurance laws exclude approximately twenty-five
percent of the American labor force, 6 and twenty percent of the labor
force is excluded from worker's compensation laws. 7 Rather than
turning toward inclusive social legislation, American workers have
traditionally formed trade unions and negotiated collectively with their
employers for the majority of their employment-related protections. 8
In the United States, collective bargaining agreements, and not
legislation, provide workers with primary protection against arbitrary
dismissal, sickness, and inadequate retirement income.
The traditional, or classic, labor historians have argued that
the "uniqueness" of the American Labor movement derives from the
"uniqueness" of the American worker. 9 According to the
traditionalists, American workers are a conservative lot that have
spurned broad visions of social reform in favor of individualistic
strategies for improving their fortunes."t Professor Derek C. Bok
4 See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).

' 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988); see Peter D. DeChiara, Rethinking the ManagerialProfessionalExemption of the FairLabor StandardsAct, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 139 (1993)
(arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act should include managerial and professional
employees in order to reduce white-collar unemployment and the amount of overworked
employees).
6 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988); Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive
Characterof American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1418 (1971) (discussing
the more active role of European governments in legislation and benefit provisions, as
well as the large disparity between retirement benefits of European and American
workers).
7 Bok, supra note 6, at 1418.
s See id. at 1419 (asserting that historically, American unions have represented
the interests of their members rather that the interests of workers as a class).
9 FORBATH, supra note 1, at 10; see JOHN COMMONS, ET AL., 2 HISTORY OF
LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 218-22 (1953) (tracing the influence of the European
International on European Labor movement).
10See Bok, supra note 6, at 1439 (contending that American workers join unions to
achieve better wages and working conditions); see also id. at 1402 (suggesting that a
lack of cohesion is reflected by "general reluctance to engage in many other forms of
mutual endeavor"); see, e.g., SELIG PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT
(1923), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 206-07 (John
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contends that "the patterns of behavior and the institutions that make
up our system of industrial relations have had a more fundamental
influence than any other factor" in shaping substantive American
labor law." According to Professor Bok, workers in the United
States have avoided class-based social reform due to: (1) "marked
reluctance to subordinate their individual autonomy to the control of
larger organizations;" 12 (2) the characteristic of American workers to
be less prone to identify themselves as members of a class and less
inclined to join together to achieve common objectives;13 and (3) a
lack of cohesion based upon a "network of language, racial and
religious barriers . . . often lead[ing] to factions within the ranks of
Labor . . . [and giving] rise to various forms of discrimination,

especially against [African-Americans] and immigrants who often
*

.

served as strikebreakers. "1"

Professor William E. Forbath"5 of the U.C.L.A. School of
Law has adopted a fascinating and compelling alternative explanation
of the "uniqueness" of the American Labor movement. In his book,
entitled Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement,
Forbath argues that legal doctrine and judicial decisions constitute the
primary, if not exclusive, factors in the shaping of the American
Labor movement. 6 According to Forbath, American workers, like
their European counterparts, initially sought to curb unbridled
capitalism through a host of legislative reforms such as "hours laws

Commons ed., 1953) (contrasting American and European ideas, stating that "the
[International] advocated economic organisation prior to and underlying political
organisation, while [Lasalle] considered a political victory as the basis of Economic
Organisation").
" Bok, supra note 6, at 1400 (arguing that causation may be traced to the very
foundation of American society and its complicated chain of human affairs).
12Id. (citing detailed discussion in PHILIP E. SLATER, THE PURSUIT OF LONELINESS:
AMERiCAN CULTURE AT THE BREAKING POINT 7-9 (1970)).
Id. at 1401 (explaining lack of "solidarity" among American workers).
I3
"Id.
at 1403. According to Professor Bok, a lack of cohesion makes it impossible
for American workers to "achieve the degree of unity reached in certain Western
European countries." Id.
'5Professor, University of California at Los Angeles; Ph.D., Yale University, 1992;
Instructor of American Studies, Yale University, 1984-89; J.D., Yale Law School, 1983;
Golieb Fellow in Legal History, New York University, 1982-83; Clerk, Judge Louis H.
Pollack, 1981-82; Co-Author, THE NIXON YEARS, 1976.
16FORBATH, supra note 1, at 3.
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and other work-place regulations, the abolition of private banking,
public funding for worker-owned industry, and the nationalization of
monopolies."' 7 Only after the judiciary declared such legislative
reform efforts unconstitutional" did Labor adopt collective bargaining
as its primary weapon against the rigors of industrialized society. 1 9
Forbath asserts:
During the decades bracketing the turn of the century,
courts exacted from labor many key strategic and
ideological accommodations, changing trade unionists'
views of what was possible and desirable in politics
and industry. Judicial review and administration of
labor legislation helped make broad legal reforms
seem futile. Similarly, the courts' harshly repressive
law of industrial conflict helped make broad, inclusive
unionism seem too costly and a more cautious,
narrower unionism essential.
Courts shaped labor's strategic calculus; ....
[T]he
proliferation of anti-strike and anti-boycott decrees
riveted trade unionists' political energies on repealing
this judge-made regime. . . . [T]he burdens and
indignities of semi-outlawry made challenging judgemade labor law a constant endeavor in the courts, in
legislatures, and in the public sphere. At the same
time, the courts' very sway made common law and
constitutional discourse beckon as the surest
framework within which to contend for legitimacy and
relief. Thus, labor leaders at all levels began to speak
and think more and more in the language of the law
17Id. at 13 (citing William E. Forbath, Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor andLaw
in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 767, 807-09 (1985)).
18See, e.g., Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-65 (1905) (holding that under

the Constitution, freedom of contract prevails over the power of the state to legislate).
19See PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 129-30 (1990) (explaining that organized labor did not like the
Lochner decision, but instead of pursuing their goals through legislation, preferred
collective bargaining and thought that if an organization was strong enough, it could
enforce its own goals without the help of the law).
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. . . . [Llabor's embrace of a law-inspired, laissezfaire rights talk displaced a more radical vocabulary
of reform.

In this fashion,

. .

. the legal order

encouraged a reshaping of the labor movement's
dominant ideology.2°

Forbath's book presents a thought-provoking alternative
explanation of the distinctiveness of American labor law. The book
is essential reading for labor scholars. However, Forbath's book is
not without its faults. Although contending not to judge Labor's
decision to seek protection through collective bargaining rather than
legislation,21 Forbath unquestionably implies that Labor must abandon
its emphasis on contractual protections and must instead seek
comprehensive and inclusive legislative reform. As explained in Part
II of this review, it is here that I disagree with Forbath.
I. The Book
Forbath's analysis begins with a critical examination of the
voluntarist perspective, which was first drawn by the founders of
American labor history. 22 According to the author, "the new labor
historians have undermined the traditional assumption that American
workers were more individualistic and less disposed than their
English or European counterparts" to engage in broad-based political
action.23 Drawing upon recent historical research, Forbath asserts
that actually "most Gilded Age trade unionists were steeped in labor
politics and reform, and most reformers were active trade
unionists. "24 Supporting his assertion, Forbath describes the activities
2oFORBATH,
21 See

supra note 1, at 6-8.

id. at 172 (stating that policy prescriptions, however, are not the author's

stock in trade).
2 Id. at 10 n.1. John Commons, Selig Perlman, and German sociologist, Werner
Sombart, are designated as the founders of American labor history. Id.
2' Id. at 11.
24 Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). The Gilded Age was a "period of currency inflation,
wide-spread speculation, overexpansion of industry, loud booming of dubious
enterprises, loose business and political morals, and flashy manners that extended from
the end of the Civil War in 1865 to the Panic of 1873." 3 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
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of the Knights of Labor, the Gilded Age's largest and most powerful
labor organization,25 which "created labor parties, ran candidates in
thirty-four of the country's thirty-five states, [and] elected members
to city and state governments. They founded factory cooperatives
and established a panoply of cultural associations. "26 The Knights'
professed goal was to prepare the working class for republican selfrule. 27 According to Forbath:
The Knights hewed to a working-class version of
traditional republican ideas about law and rights.
They held that republican government rested on a
virtuous and independent citizenry; and that citizens'
political and economic independence were
intertwined, both requiring a rough measure of
economic equality. .

.

. [T]hey saw as law's chief

aim not the security of private rights but the
preservation of the social conditions necessary for
such a self-governing citizenry. Workers read these
traditional principles to mean that in an industrial
society the very survival of republican government
demanded the use of governmental power to quell the
"tyranny" of corporations and capital.28
Forbath further asserts that the more conservative American
Federation of Labor (AFL) initially shared the Knights' radical
reform ambitions. 29 In 1894, "a majority of the AFL's constituent
unions endorsed a socialist platform that called for 'independent labor

HISTORY 180 (1976).
25FORBATH, supra note 1, at 12.; see SAMUEL GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE

AND LABOR: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY xix (Nick Salvatore ed., 1984) (describing the
founding of the Knights of Labor).
' FORBATH, supra note 1, at 13; see LEON FINK, WORKINGMEN'S DEMOCRACY:

THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS 8-9 (1983) (describing the value of
culture in the advancement of democratic civilization).
27 FORBATH, supra note 1, at 13.

Id. at 13 (footnote omitted); see FINK, supra note 26, at 14 (describing the Knights
as forming the backbone of local labor movements and as "first of all a coalition of
reactivating, or already organized, trade unions") (footnote omitted).
29FORBATH, supra note 1, at 14.
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politics' and an eleven point legislative program" calling for workplace regulation, a universal eight-hour day and national ownership
of industry. 3"
Similarly, Forbath rejects the traditionalists' claim that ethnic
and racial divisions prevented the creation of "broad class-based
organizational solidarities," 31 yet concedes that ethnic divisions often
impeded the creation of class-based alliances. 32 Forbath argues "that,
by themselves, these divisions hardly account for the sharp narrowing
of American labor politics."33 To support this conclusion, Forbath
notes that "the Knights reached out from a base among coal miners
and artisans to a constituency that embraced the burgeoning new
factory proletariat-and included new immigrants, blacks, and women
alongside old immigrants and old stock Americans . . ...
As
further support, Forbath relates the merging of native-born skilled
railway workers with the railroads' new immigrant semi-skilled and
unskilled workers by enlistment in the Knights of Labor railway
branches, as well as, in locals of Eugene Debs' American Railway
Union.35 Forbath denies ethnic antagonism as a factor leading to the
demise of these labor organizations,36 concluding that the explanation

Ild. at 14 (citing Martin Shefter, Trade Unions and Political Machines: The
Organization and Disorganizationof the American Working Class in the Late-Nineteenth
Century, in WORKING-CLASS

FORMATION:

NINETEENTH-CENTURY

PATTERNS

IN

WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 257 (Ira Katznelson & Aristide R. Zolberg
eds., 1986) [hereinafter WORKING-CLASS FORMATION] (acknowledging that the ultimate
rejection of the socialist platform at the 1894 AFL Convention was due to "parliamentary
sleight-of-hand" by the AFL leadership)).
31Id. at 23.
32Id. at 24.

33Id. (footnote omitted).
34FORBATH, supra note 1, at 13 (citing FINK, supra note 26, at 169) ("The Knights
loomed in the mid-1880's as a beacon of racial enlightenment"); see id. at 221
(emphasizing the critical dependence of the Knights of Labor upon worker cooperation
across diverse racial and ethnic communities).
31Id. at 23 (citing FINK, supra note 26, at 169).
' See FORBATH, supra note 1, at 35; see, e.g., FINK, supra note 26, at 219
(describing union organization as a result of common experiences and shared economic
antagonisms).
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for a social movement devoid of class distinctions must lie
elsewhere."
Thus, having dispelled the traditionalists' explanation of the
American Labor movement's "uniqueness," Forbath presents a
forceful story of how the courts and legal dogma forever altered the
American Labor movement." Drawing upon extensive legal and
historical research, 39 he argues that the Gilded Age activists suffered
such severe setbacks from the courts40 that they abandoned their early
efforts to establish class-based legislative reform. 4 The activists,
instead, adopted the narrow self-interested philosophy of
"voluntarism" that now permeates the American Labor movement.42
According to Forbath, the transformation of the American Labor
movement from a radical class-based movement to one based upon

17 See FORBATH, supra note 1, at 25 (supporting the conclusion that ethnic
antagonism does not account for the distinctive character of the American Labor
movement, contrasting the ethnicity of the American Labor movement with that of
Europe, and noting that European countries shared similar ethnic conflicts); see also
FINK, supra note 26, at 221 (offering the "splintering off of the skilled membership
when the Knights no longer met their needs," as a reason for the demise of the Knights
of Labor and assigning the economic and political success of the Knights in the biracial
South to "the cooperation of disaffected white Democrats with black Republicans");
Aristide R. Zolberg, How Many Fsceptionalisms?, in WORKINO-CLASS FORMATION,
supra note 30, at 425-30 (noting the commitment of working class organizations to the
pursuit of their objectives even if they included revolutionary change).

I FORBATH, supra note 1, at 25-33.
39 Id.
0 Id. at 27-28 (describing the courts' role in protecting and nurturing the economy
and society).
41 Id. at 2.
41 Id. at 1-2 n.3 (quoting Samuel Gompers, Judicial Vindication of Labor's Claims,
7 AM. FEDERATIONIST 283, 287 (1901) (defining voluntarism as a labor historian's term
for [L]abor's "staunch commitment to the 'private' ordering of industrial relations
between unions and employers"). "Voluntarism teaches that workers should pursue
improvements in their living and working conditions through collective bargaining and
concerted action in the private sphere rather than through public political action and
legislation." Id. at 1-2. Voluntarism can also be referred to as "[Liabor's version of
laissez-faire, and statist philosophy that says the 'best thing the State can do for labor is
to leave labor alone."' Id; see GOMPERS, supra note 25, at xxiv-xxv (describing the
alteration of voluntarism, evolving from a denial of a state role in industrial relations to
a belief in individualism which "threatened the justification of any group organization"
in its exclusion of a "complex political economy" that governed American
industrialization).
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voluntarism occurred in three stages. 43
A. The First Transformation
First, the courts nullified Labor's early attempts at broadbased inclusive legislative reform."4 Labor's primary goals during the
late-nineteenth century were to legislate a shorter workday, to curtail
"sweat shops" through legislative bans on manufacturing in tenement
dwellings, to abolish payment of wages by company scrip, and to
prohibit anti-union discrimination. 4'
However, Labor's early
successes in enacting such protective legislation proved unavailing.46
Once passed, the judiciary sharply disemboweled or invalidated
Labor's legislative victories. 47 "By the turn of the century state and
federal courts had invalidated roughly sixty labor laws. 4 Foremost
among these decisions was the Supreme Court's Lochner v. New
York49 decision and the New York Court of Appeals' In re Jacobs5°

43 FORBATH, supra note 1, at 25. The three central features molding 19th century
labor politics are denominated by Forbath as "federalism, the nature and role of political
parties, and the absence of an administrative state elite (or, what is the other side of the
same coin, the judiciary's role as the era's sole state elite)." Id.
I See id. at 38 (citing the legislation that was overturned and invalidated nationwide
between 1885 and 1930 by state and federal courts including the United States Supreme
Court; the legislation struck down involved such matters as discrimination against union
members, weighing of coal at mines, regular payment of wages, payment by scrip,
hours, child labor, blacklisting, employment of women, etc.).
I Id. at 37; see Shefter, in WoRKING-CLASs FORMATION, supra note 30, at 263
(designating "[L]abor's pursuit of the eight-hour day" as the driving force behind the
changes in the American Labor movement's orientation to politics, and modes of action
and organization); see also GOMPERS, supra note 25, at 94 (discussing the 1868 eighthour law for federal employees, which was virtually ignored; the response to
enforcement of this law resulted in the interpretation that "a reduction in wages must
accompany a reduction in hours").
46 FORBATH, supra note 1, at 38.
47Id.
Id. (citing numerous cases which held that strikes to enforce union work standards
and work rules were illegal); see, e.g., Benito Rovira Co. v. Yampolsky, 187 N.Y.S
894 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912 (8th Cir. 1897); Folsom
Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 126 N.E. 479 (Mass. 1920).
49 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
'0 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
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decision. In both cases, the judiciary found that laws designed to
protect employees from undue exploitation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because the laws interfered with the constitutional right
of employee and employer to enter into contracts free from state
interference."1
In Lochner, the Supreme Court invalidated a New York law
forbidding employment in a bakery for more than sixty hours a week
or ten hours a day. 2 Emphasizing the Court's growing intolerance
with "interference" by state legislatures in the free market economy,
the Court declared that "the freedom of master and employd to
contract with each other in relation to their employment, and in
defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without
violating the Federal Constitution."5 In Jacobs, New York State's
highest court struck down legislation that would have banned the
manufacturing of cigars in tenement dwellings. 54 As with Lochner,
the Jacobs court emphasized the judiciary's disdain for legislation that
interfered with "free labor. "
Forbath contends that the effect that these decisions had upon
the ideology of the American Labor movement is far more important
than the courts' actual holdings.56 Prior to Jacobs, Samuel Gompers
maintained "strong ties to the Marxist branch of the first
International," 57 and, although he opposed "Lassallean" socialism,5"
"he remained open to political radicalism. "" Indeed, Gompers led

"' Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64; Jacobs, 98 N.Y. at 115.
12 198 U.S. at 58.
Ild. at 64.
s498 N.Y. at 115 (applying constitutional protections of "personal liberty and private
property" to strike down a New York City public health law).
55Id. at 106-07 (upholding "right to choice of a trade or profession" as a
fundamental right of liberty under the Constitution).
56 Id. at 42 (citing GOMPERS, supra note 25, at 196).
57FOR.BATH, supra note 1, at 40; see GOMPERS, supra note 25, at 60 (describing

socialist influence on "the old International").
58FORBATH, supra note 1, at 40 (stating that Lasallean socialism discouraged
involvement in trade unions in "favor of political engagement").
59Id. at 40. Contra GOMPERS, supra note 25, at 65-66 (specifying that the
Economic and Sociological Club, a group of trade unionists formed for the purpose of
extending and defending principles of trade unionism, "refused to subordinate the trade
union to any 'ism' or political 'reform"').
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the cigar-makers' efforts to secure the protective legislation' that was
later invalidated in Jacobs.61 According to Forbath, the Jacobs
decision discouraged Gompers' efforts in the political arena.62
Gompers soon learned that, in an age of judicial supremacy, 63
"[slecuring the enactment of a law does not mean the solution of the
[Tihe power of the courts to pass upon
problem . . . .
constitutionality of law so complicate[s] reform by legislation as to
seriously restrict the effectiveness of that method. 6"
Forbath's first transformation was now complete. Subsequent
to the dismantling of Labor's protective legislation, the American
Labor movement and, in particular, the AFL abandoned broad-based
political reforms in favor of a comprehensive plan of class-based
economic warfare. 65 Forbath explains that the "[i]nvalidated labor

laws were powerful evidence of and a metaphor for the recalcitrance
of the American state and the wisdom of voluntarism

. . .

. [T]he

American workplace seemed, increasingly, the only worthwhile
avenue for gaining reforms .... ,66

B. The Second Transformation
When Labor turned from political reform to economic action,

6oGOMPERS, supra note 25, at 58. The great strike was described as ending in a
compromise that created "a sense of power that struggle develops." Id.
6'98 N.Y. at 115; see FORBATH, supra note 1, at 39-41; see also GOMPERS, supra

note 25, at 61-62 (characterizing legislative enactments followed by judicial invalidations
as fuel for the accomplishment of union goals through means other than legislation).
62 FORBATH,

supra note 1, at 41-42.

But see GOMPERS, supra note 25, at 66.

Gompers' membership in the Economic and Sociological club brought about his
realization that "the trade union was the fundamental agency through which we could
achieve economic power, which would in turn give us social and political power." Id.
Further, according to Gompers, partisanship was refused not only because its methods
were essentially different from those of industry but also because "legislation could affect
the lives of men at work in a very few points-and those not vitally important for
progressively improving conditions." Id.
6 FORBATH, supra note 1, at 41.
See GOMPERS, supra note 25, at 194.
65See FORBATH, supra note 1, at 54-57.
6

66 Id.

at 54-55.
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the courts extended the labor injunction67 to halt all but the most
"minimalist" economic action.6" Unlike today's labor disputes, latenineteenth and early-twentieth century labor disputes consisted of
class-based economic boycotts coupled with extensive secondary
strike activity.69 As Forbath explains:
The boycott's aim and the solidarities it established
beyond individual work-places distinguished this
weapon from the typical strike . . . . [T]he 1880's
boycott was almost always a rich illustration of what
treatise writers would soon be calling a "compound"
or "secondary" boycott. If a city labor federation, for
example, called a boycott against a brewer . . . it
would do more than proclaim his beer "unfair."
Representatives would visit saloons and call on them
to cease serving his beer or face boycotts and picket
lines themselves. Similarly, a boycott against a
printer meant notifying all the printer's
customers-"hotels, boarding houses, public schools,
railroads and steamships "-that all who continued to
patronize the printer would be put on the city labor
weekly's "black list. ,70
The courts had no patience for Labor's attempts to turn socalled "individual" labor disputes into broad class-based struggles.71
"The[] boycotts provoked [the] courts' anxiety and rage, in part
"..
72
because they mobilized whole working-class populations .
"Declar[ing] tha[t] an entrepreneur's or worker's right to pursue his

Id. at 84-85. Generally, the courts view boycotts as an assault on the courts and

state, as well as, on marketplace freedom. Id.
" See id. (explaining how minimalist economic actions became non-existent when
equity judges held employer's profit-making activity to be part of his "property;" all
boycotts, therefore, became unlawful).
I Id. at 82-83; see Shefter, in WORKiNG-CLASS FORMATION, supra note 30, at 22021 (characterizing boycotts as a secondary form of collective action).
70 FORBATH,

supra note 1, at 82-83 (footnotes omitted).

" See id. at 83 (explaining how entire working class populations, families, and
communities were mobilized to support boycotts).
2 Id.
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calling or business was a constitutional property right,"73 the courts
acted swiftly and delineated a "realm of legitimate strikes." 74 "The
general rule was that strikes seeking no gain for the strikers . . .
were deemed to be prompted by malice, "" which caused many union
strikes to be categorized as illegal.76
In the 1890s, for instance, "courts enjoined at least 15 percent
of recorded sympathy strikes. That percentage rose to 25 percent in
the next decade, and by the 1920s[,] 46 percent of all sympathy
strikes were greeted by anti-strike decrees. "77 Forbath asserts that
"[i]njunctions figured in virtually every railroad strike; in most strikes
in which industrial unionism, 'amalgamation,' or 'federation' was at
issue; in most major organizing and recognition strikes, boycotts,
closed shop or sympathy strikes .... "78

Moreover, when Labor resisted the court's broad injunctions,
the federal courts "ordered local officials .

.

. to refrain from

enforcing the criminal law against strikebreakers and company
police. "" If the local authorities resisted, the federal courts would
deputize private police or encourage state and federal troops to
intervene in the dispute on behalf of the employer."0 Faced with
broad injunctions, contempt citations, and jail," l Labor decided to

7
'4

Id. at 87.
Id. at 88-89.

75FORBATH, supra note 1, at 89.
7'Id. (citing cases which held that strikes to enforce union work standards and work

rules were illegal); see, e.g., Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 126 N.E. 479 (Mass.
1920) (awarding injunctive relief against worker picketing and upholding right of
employer to hire workmen, unhampered by union interference); Benito Rovira Co. v.
Yampolsky, 187 N.Y.S. 894 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (granting injunction to prevent picketing
in front of plaintiffs place of business); Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912 (8th
Cir. 1897) (upholding grant of temporary injunction and acknowledging the right to form
labor organizations yet condemning interference, "other than by lawful competition, with
the business affairs of others").
7 FORBATH, supra note 1, at 62.
7 Id. at 62 (footnote omitted).
7 James G. Pope, The Past ofLaborLaw-and its Future, 39 UCLA L. REv. 481,
486 (1992) (citing FORBATH, supra note 1, at 103-04).
SOId. at 486.

81FORBATH, supra note 1, at 74-75.
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moderate its economic campaign. 82
By the early 1890s, the courts had thus convinced most Labor
leaders that "broad, inclusive strikes would run up against violent
state opposition, and that state force would arrive with high legal
sanctions. "3
Forbath's second transformation was complete. Aware that
"broad class-based" economic actions "were too costly and selfdefeating, "84 the American Labor movement decided "to conserve and
build upon what 'worked'-minimalists politics, craft unionism, high
dues, and restrained but well-calculated strike policies. ""

C. The Third Transformation
In the third and final transformation, Forbath contends that
Labor's struggle for legitimacy eventually led Labor to immerse itself
in the language of the law.86 In the end, Forbath asserts that law not
only shaped the economic/political strategies employed by Labor, but
it also transformed the American Labor movement's vision, identity
and mission. 7 According to Forbath:
[T]he law's social and political authority compelled
speaking in the law's terms. Labor, moreover, was
drawn to mining the fine radical veins of legal
tradition. The result was a subtle but pervasive
change in the labor movement's dominant language of
protest and consciousness of rights. Legal discourse
helped shape new principles and new parameters of
argument; it infused new meanings into inherited
12

See id. at 90-91, 95 (discussing the "less 'disorderly' form of boycotting" by

informing public through labor newspapers about "unfair" products).
" Id. at 94.
8' Id. at 78 (footnote omitted).
s Id. at 96 (footnote omitted); see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINs, THE STATE AND THE
UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN

AMERICA 1880-1960 60-61 (1985) (describing the overwhelming defeat for unions and
the goal of organized labor to seek accommodation within political economy).
86

FORBATH, supra note 1, at 128.

T See id.
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ideals like "equal rights." Trade unionists also came
to defend, and even to understand, specific outlawed
union activities using new arguments, analogies, and
metaphors inspired by the common law.88
Forbath argues that the labor activists of the 1880s and 1890s
"embraced the radical ideas that wage labor was inconsistent with
republican citizenship, that property was tyranny, and that
government should intervene to impose republican principles on
property and industry. "89 After being battered and beaten for two
decades in the courts, Labor "abandoned [its] radical republican
claims upon the government," 9 and in the early-1900s adopted the
"anti-statist liberalism that . . . resembled the philosophy of their

judicial adversaries. "' Instead of seeking the repeal of judge-made
"contract" and "property" rights, Labor simply sought the extension
of the same rights to labor. 92 In attacking anti-boycott decrees, for
instance, the AFL argued that "had the action taken by the labor
organization instead been taken by manufacturers, it 'might have been
fairly considered a legitimate battle of trade with which a court of
equity should not have interfered."' ,93 The total transformation was
now complete. Instead of attacking "property" and "contract" law,
trade "unionists analogized labor rights to corporate property rights
and lambasted the labor injunction as special government solicitude
for [C]apital.'"I4 *"
Forbath readily acknowledges that Labor's transformation
from a radical "anti-capitalist" movement to a "distinctively"
American Labor movement did not go unrewarded.95 The AFL's
88 Id.

89Pope, supra note 79, at 487 (citing FORBATH, supra note 1, at 129-30).
9oFORBATH, supra note 1, at 130.
91 Id.

Id. at 134. "Liberty of contract" is pinpointed as a sure way to legitimate
collective action. Id.
" Id. at 132 (footnote omitted).
9 Pope, supra note 79, at 487 (citing FORBATH, supra note 1, at 131-32).
95FORBATH, supra note 1, at 148 (citing Labor Secures Test Vote, ILL. ST. FED'N
LAB. WKLY. NEWSL., Apr. 4, 1925, at 1 (describing the outrage of Congress and state
legislatures when "government by injunction" undermined trial by jury and trampled the
First Amendment)).
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adoption of "free market" ideologies96 allowed Labor to argue that (1)
collective bargaining agreements should be entitled to the same
protection afforded master/employee contracts; and (2) labor
associations should be treated the same as any other "business"
association.97 Building on the common law of capitalism and the
United States Constitution, Labor argued that:
[O]rganized workers were freely associating citizens
who ought to enjoy the same freedom of action and
expression that individual workers and citizens
enjoyed. To grant them such freedoms was to grant
them no more than what "combinations of capital"
enjoyed as legal persons.98
Labor's argument quickly won support from a number of
influential judges,9 9 including Justice Holmes,1"' and, ironically,
Labor began obtaining injunctions prohibiting employers from
conspiring to violate or induce violations of collective bargaining
agreements. 10 ' Labor obtained court orders upholding union strikes
to enforce closed shop agreements. For example, in National
Protective Association of Steam Fitters & Helpers v. Cumming, 02 the
court upheld the Steam Fitters' right to strike for a closed shop on the
grounds that union action was lawful because the action was within
the "every-day acts of the business world,"'0 3 and apparently within
the domain of competition as "judged according to the motive of the
actor. .

.

. [These] principles concede the right of an association to

"See id. at 135-36 (describing legitimized "workers' collective action" as
presumptively worthy of same treatment accorded employer's collective action).
97Id.
I Id. at 147 (footnote omitted).
99Id.
"oSee Vegelahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
'0' FORBATH, supra note 1, at 124-25; see, e.g., Schlessingerv. Quinto, 192 N.Y.S.
564, 569 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 194 N.Y.S. 401, 409 (App. Div. 1922) (upholding right
of an employee organization to restrain their employer's violation of contractual
obligations).
'0' 63 N.E. 369 (N.Y. 1902).
'" Id. at 371 (defining scope of lawful and unlawful organizational activities).
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strike in order to benefit its members." 104
Additionally, Labor's adoption of a laissez-faire, free-market
ideology"0 5 allowed Labor to contend for "legitimacy" while actively
defying the law. 1 6 From the 1900s through the 1920s, Labor
adopted a "campaign of massive and articulate defiance" of federal
injunctions. 117 When charged with lawbreaking, "[Labor] invoked
[its] alternative constitutional vision."108 Over time, "many middle
class 'experts' and reformers, many elite lawyers, academics, and
politicians"10 9 began to echo Labor's claim that government by
injunction was unconstitutional. 1 0 Eventually, Congress passed the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 1 which banned most labor injunctions, and
the National Labor Relations Act,112 which guaranteed employees the
right to join and form labor unions.' 13
Although acknowledging Labor's victories, Forbath argues
that the cost was too high." 4 According to Forbath, Labor's adoption
of the "dominant legal language" ratified American corporate power
over economic life and, effectively, foreclosed "more radical ways of
describing and criticizing the nation's political economy. "115

104 Id.

at 371-72.
supra note 1, at 135.
IId. at 145-47. The workers' perspective emphasized that judicial decisions were

. FORPBATH,

in violation of the Constitution. Id.
101Id. at 142.
11 Pope, supra note 79, at 489 (citing FORBATH, supra note 1, at 145-47 (explaining
Labor's anaogly of defiance of "unjust laws" to an anti-slavery movement)).
9 FORBATH, supra note 1, at 159.
11 See id. at 159 (supporting claims that injunctions were to blame for industrial
unrest); see also Pope, supra note 79, at 489 (explaining that middle class experts and
legislators became aware that the worker support necessary for industrial stability was
missing).
"' 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90,
§ 1, 47 Stat. 70).
11229 U.S.C. §§ 151-58, 159-69 (1988).
See FORBATH, supra note 1, at 158-62 (following development of anti-injunction
...
bill into the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
"I Id. at 3. Forbath claims that Labor's broad vision of reform was dethroned by
the rise of Samuel Gompers' "pure and simple" trade unionism. Id.; see GOMPERS,
supra note 25, at 385.
15 FORBATH, supra note 1, at 135.
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Critique

Forbath's Law and the Shaping of the American Labor
Movement constitutes an important addition to the historian's debate
regarding the distinction between the American Labor movement and
the European Labor movement. Where other labor historians have
focused upon the alleged "uniqueness" of the American worker and
the American industrial system," 6 Forbath focuses upon the American
legal structure. 7 Further, where other labor historians have viewed
the law and the courts as playing a derivative role,"' Forbath asserts
that the courts and legal doctrine constituted a primary motivating
factor.' 19 "Although deeply indebted to the pioneers of American
labor history

. . .

this book suggests that some of their key common

assumptions about law's role in that history are wrong." 120 Albeit
persuasive, Forbath's arguments are not without their flaws.
Age
As an initial matter, Forbath's portrayal of the Gilded
12 1
noted:
have
critics
some
As
skewed.
is
Labor movement
Forbath presents an inflated picture of [L]abor's
radical potential. In [his] haste to correct the errors
of previous labor historians [he] has committed the
opposite error .... Forbath fails to confront the fact

that the Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of
Labor, which purportedly exemplified GildedAge
labor radicalism, had an official national policy
prohibiting local assemblies from going so far as to

11

See Bok, supra note 6, at 1458-59; SELIG

PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE LABOR

(1928); WERNER SOMBART, WHY IS THERE No SOCIALISM IN AMERICA?
(1905); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer. Further "Reflections on the Distinctive
Characterof American Labor Laws", 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1 (1990).
117 FORBATH, supra note 1, at 3.
MOVEMENT

118Id.
119Id.
120 Id.
12

See Pope, supra note 79, at 490 (citing Victoria C. Hattam, Economic Visions

and Political Strategies:American Labor and the State, 1865-1896, 4 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 82, 84 (1990)).
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22
discuss political action.1

Similarly, other critics have noted that Forbath failed to
provide sufficient evidence to support his hypothesis that law actually
altered Labor's consciousness as opposed to simply changing the
strategic weapons employed by Labor.' 23 Indeed, the only "hard"
evidence presented by Forbath consists of his citation to four or five
internal union communications, 24 in which unions allegedly
"embraced the language" of the judiciary. 2 5 This scant evidence
hardly supports his broad conclusion that all of Labor adopted and
embraced the capitalist system.
Rather than reiterate these criticisms, I shall critique Forbath's
underlying message that Labor should abandon its emphasis on
collective bargaining and, instead, turn to the political arena where
it could seek the broad class-based legislative reform allegedly
envisioned by Gilded Age labor activists. Although stating that
policy prescriptions are not his stock in trade,' 126 Forbath states in his
conclusion, that "'rights talk' and 'legal consciousness' sharply
delimit the political imaginations of the downtrodden," and that "it
seems doubtful that a laissez-faire regime, even a pro-Labor laissezfaire regime, would suffice to meet the aspirations of a great many

'2 Pope, supra note 79, at 490 (footnotes omitted); see FINK, supra note 26, at 2325, 33 (explaining that the Knights were "ambivalent about the role of the state and the
proper political strategy for the labor movement").
123Pope, supra note 79, at 490. Pope argues that Forbath bears the burden of
showing "that labor might otherwise have moved in a broader, more political direction."
Id.
124 See FORBATH, supra note 1, at 131-34 (citing Letterfrom George J. Knott, 28
TYPOoRAPHICALJ. 184, 186 (1906) (referring to a right to persuasion, promising better
conditions as being illegal); Letter from George J. Knott, 27 TYPOoRAPHICAL J. 563,
565-66 (1905) (commending rivalry between unions and employers associations as good
business); A Just Court Decision, 15 AM. FEDERATIONIST 76 (1908) (commending the

reversal of a New York appellate decision granting injunction against strike); Samuel
Gompers, Judge Holdoin's Injunction Frenzy, 13 AM. FEDERATIONIST 156, 157 (1906)
(quoting Indiana Supreme Court's support of the right to peaceful argument and
persuasion); Samuel Gompers, Judicial Vindication of Labor's Claims, 7 AM.
FEDERATIONIST 283, 284 (1901).
125FORBATH, supra note 1, at 132.
'2

Id. at 172.
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American workers. 1127 Thus, even though he denies that his book
contains a political message, Forbath clearly believes that Labor must
128
adopt a broad-based political strategy if Labor intends to survive.
I strongly disagree with this aspect of Forbath's analysis.
In his zeal to demonstrate that the courts played a dominant
and motivating role in Labor's decision to abandon legislative reform
in favor of private action,' 29 Forbath mistakenly assumes that the
American working class has suffered as a result. 30 Contrary to

Forbath's assumption, one can argue persuasively that the American
working class has, and will continue to fare better under voluntarism.
Indeed, labor economists have repeatedly emphasized that unionized
workers in the United States are among the most highly compensated
workers in the world.13 They receive approximately twenty to
twenty-five percent higher pay than their non-union American
colleagues,' and they receive substantially greater relative year-toyear salary increases than their European counterparts.' 33 America's
trade unionists enjoy "unequalled safeguards against arbitrary
treatment," including discharge and layoff,' 34 and a constantly
growing list of fringe benefits such as pensions, insurance, and
medical benefits.' 35 Finally, unions in America have received
substantial credit for reducing the disparity in treatment of African-

2

Id.

28See id. (expressing doubt that "laissez-faire regime" suffices to meet aspirations

of American workers); see also id. at 1 (describing success elsewhere through the use
of class-based political movements).
129 Id. at 8.
130FORBATH, supra note 1, at 174.
131Cf. RicHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 46-54
(1983); RONALD G. EHRENBERo & R. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 356-58

(1982).
132See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 131, at 85-86 (comparing hourly pay of
blue collar union workers with that of non-union workers, both in the manufacturing
sector and non-manufacturing sector).
113 EHRENBERO & SMITH, supra note 131, at 358. Between 1971 and 1981, the
union/non-union wage differential in America increased by approximately nine percent.
Id. at 53. The comparable figure for German workers over a longer time period is
approximately 6.2%. Id.
" Bok, supra note 6, at 1459.
135See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 131, at 61-77.
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Americans and other minorities. 36
The American Labor movement's flaw does not lie in the
treatment of unionized workers. Rather, its major flaw constitutes
the inability of unions to successfully organize large segments of the
American population. "The National Labor Relations Act excludes
up to fifty percent of the labor force from its coverage . . 137
Moreover, among the covered population, the percentage of
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements has steadily
declined for the past four decades.1 38 In early 1956, nearly thirtyfour percent of all private nonagricultural workers belonged to labor
unions.1 39 By 1980, that figure had declined to an unprecedented
twenty-four percent, 40 and the latest figures estimate that a mere
twelve percent of private sector workers enjoy the benefits of
unionism today.141
The question Forbath seeks to answer is whether the European
system, which affords slightly less protection to a far greater number
of persons, is superior to the American system, which affords
somewhat greater protection to a far fewer number of persons.
Assuming that the European system could be transplanted to America,
Forbath argues for the former. 14 2 My disagreement does not exist on
the ideological level. If I believed that the European system would
work in America, I, like most other pro-union Americans, would
argue for Labor to place increased emphasis on broad class-based
legislative reform. Rather, I disagree with Forbath because I believe
that two substantial and insurmountable obstacles exist to the
successful adoption of the European-style Labor movement.

13 See, e.g., EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 131, at 356 ("[l]n spite of well
publicized conflicts between some unions and civil rights organizations over union
seniority rules and the use of racial quotas, unions appear to have improved the
economic well-being of black males relative to white males."); FREEMAN & MEDOFF,
supra note 131, at 48-52 (explaining that the rise in union wages between blacks and
whites is generally equal).
13'Bok, supra note 6, at 1418 (footnote omitted).
13 Id.

139 FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 131, at 221.
140

Id.

141 Richard Freeman & Joel Rogers, A New Dealfor Labor, N.Y. TES, Mar. 10,

1993, at A19.
142 FORBATH, supra note 1, at 3.
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First, even if Labor successfully encouraged Congress to
enact progressive social legislation, there is no guarantee and, in fact,
substantial reason to doubt that today's courts would treat such
legislation more favorably than they have treated Labor's latenineteenth century social legislation. Today's federal courts, like the
late-nineteenth century courts, have shown outright hostility towards
labor and civil rights legislation. In the past decade, the federal
courts have restricted the rights of union organizers to speak with
non-union employees,' 143 expanded the scope of permissible
discrimination against strikers,'" limited employees' rights under the
Railway Labor Act'45 to bargain over the very existence of their
continued employment, 146 and upheld the discharge of a union
employee for merely attending a rally that urged the boycott of the
47
employer's product. 1
Similarly, the federal courts have gutted other progressive
social legislation over the past decade. In 1989, alone, the Supreme
Court issued five decisions interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964148 and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870149 to

143

See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992); see also Peter D.

DeChiara, No Solicitation Allowed: Union OrganizerAccess After Lechmere, Inc., 43
LAB. L.J. 593 (1992) (arguing that "the [NLRB] and the courts took the wrong approach
in organizer access cases" and that Lechmere made the situation worse).
I" See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants,
489 U.S. 426, 443 (1989) (upholding crossover policy providing preferential job
placement to non-strikers); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 802
F.2d 886, 909 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987) (upholding "superpay"
to strike replacements).
14' 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1988).
' See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Execs. Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490,
509 (1989) (vacating injunction prohibiting rail carrier from selling assets to non-union
subsidiary and firing 500 employees in connection with reorganization); see also Air
Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 863 F.2d 891, 893-94 (D.C. Cir.
1988), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 37 (1991), and cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 2437
(1993) (vacating injunction prohibiting furlough of 3,388 employees absent exhaustion
of the Railway Labor Act's mandatory collective bargaining process).
147Hormel Inc. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1992). An employee's
discharge was upheld even though union member "did not address the crowd nor, . ..
did he carry a sign, wear a button, or otherwise express in words his support for the
boycott." Id.
'4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
14942 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
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significantly dilute important protections against employment
discrimination tS5 In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,' 5 ' for
example, the Supreme Court altered the burden of proof in "disparate
impact" cases;"' thus, the Court placed a significant hurdle in the
path of employees who seek to demonstrate that their employer has
adopted and implemented a discriminatory employment practice.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that any new social
legislation will receive substantially different treatment. To the
contrary, early indications with respect to the Civil Rights Act of
1991151 (1991 Act) indicate that the conservative federal judges,
appointed by former Presidents Reagan and Bush, will continue to
disembowel any progressive legislation. 54
' Notwithstanding the stated
goal of the 1991 Act,' 55 the federal courts' first experiences with it

I5o See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989)
(defining unfair employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as determined by "disparate-impact" theory construed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971)); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989)
(considering the fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1870 does not apply to conduct
occurring "after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the right
to enforce established contract obligations."); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 758-59
(1989) (holding that white fire-fighters in Birmingham, Alabama, were deprived of their
legal rights, despite the fact that they were not parties to consent decree proceedings);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (altering the burden of proof under
Title VII by interpreting congressional intent); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,
490 U.S. 900, 903-04 (1989) (interpreting the "limitations period" as defined under Title
VII).
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
ld. at 659-60 (finding that the standard of review, "that the challenged practice
I2
be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business," is all but impossible for
employers to meet).
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991).
1 See J.R. Franke, The Civil Rights of 1991."Remedial Civil Rights PoliciesPrevail,
17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267, 296-97; see, e.g., Majer v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No.
90 Civ. 4608, 1992 WL 110995, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1992) (barring the
application of the 1991 Act because "Labor Law Sect. 740 is analogous to prior version
of Title VII").
"I H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552. The stated goal of the 1991 Act is twofold: First, to provide
monetary remedies for victims of intentional employment discrimination to compensate
them for resulting injuries and to provide more effective deterrence; and second, to
respond to the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring federal civil
rights protections against employment discrimination. Id. Compare with holdings of
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holdings that the 1991 Act would not apply
resulted in 156
retroactively.
Second, even if social legislation survived judicial scrutiny,
employer resistance would likely render social reform meaningless
for most Americans. Forbath would likely agree that throughout the
course of labor relations in America, employers and employerorganizations have made strong and persistent efforts to avoid unions,
collective bargaining, and other forms of worker protection.11 7 As
Professor Bok has articulated:
[E]ven a cursory study of the cases brought before the

NLRB reveals the extent of determined opposition to
collective bargaining that still persists. Thousands of
cases are brought each year alleging the firing of
employees for engaging in union activities, and the
1 58
number of these complaints is constantly growing.
Susan Catler mentions that the extension of "union-like" rights
to non-union employees would in the long run harm American
workers by providing them with a false sense of security. 15 9 For

instance, Catler argues that most judicial or legislative actions to
abolish the employment "at will" doctrine would be both

cases cited supra note 150.
1s See Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the 1991 Act did not apply retroactively and that a hiring policy adopted by consent
decree was subject to the law in effect at that time); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co.,
960 F.2d 1370, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that § 101 of the 1991 Act, which
overruled Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), "should not be
retroactively applied to pending cases or other pre-enactment conduct"); Mozee v.
American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
"that provisions of the 1991 Act apply prospectively on appeal"); Luddington v. Indiana
Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the 1991 Act "is
applicable only to conduct engaged in after the effective dates"); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's
Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1372 (5th Cir. 1992) (following holdings of Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits).
i7 Bok, supra note 6, at 1410.
1" Id. (footnote omitted).
'59Susan L. Catler, The Case Against Proposalsto Eliminate the Employment at Will
Rule, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 471, 472 (1983).
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inappropriate and ineffective for two reasons."
Catler's first reason is that a lawsuit "is substantially more
complex, legalistic and costly than filing a union grievance and, thus,
less accessible to employees." 6 Catler's observation is borne out by
a review of wrongful discharge cases brought under state law.162
Even a scant review of such decisions demonstrates the vast majority
of cases are brought by highly compensated white-collar
employees. 161 Second, Catler asserts that statutorily mandated
reinstatement schemes, outside the collective bargaining context, tend
to provide an inadequate remedy for unjust dismissal.' 64 Putting one
and two together, Catler concludes that government legislation may
actually harm American workers:
Theoretically, granting a right not to be discharged
without just cause might actually weaken the position
of currently unprotected individuals. This would
occur if, as a result of the statutory provision,
employees voted not to unionize because the marginal
value of a union contract was not sufficiently
attractive to support an organizing drive .... [T]he
position of some at will employees would also be
weakened if, as a result of the statutory provision,
workers who would otherwise have sought jobs in
unionized shops or positions covered by civil service
6
legislation took jobs protected only by the statute.1 1
Agreeing with the aforementioned scholars, I find that I
cannot embrace Forbath's argument that Labor should abandon
collective bargaining and, instead, seek broad class-based social
reform. I do, however, embrace Forbath's sub-theme that Labor
166
should engage in nonviolent civil disobedience.

'6'

Id. at 471.

161Id. at 496 (footnotes omitted).
'Q Id. at 496-97.
163Id.

'"Catler, supra note 159, at 505-06.
,6Id. at 507; see Bok, supra note 6, at 1439.
'" See FORBATH, supra note 1, at 8, 173.

446 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. XI

Although not appropriately emphasized by Forbath, his brief
account of Labor's organized defiance of injunctions and court orders
demonstrates that Labor achieved its greatest gains, both at the
bargaining table and in Washington, when it openly defied those
"unjust" laws that treated Labor and Capital differently.167 As other
critics have noted, this argument has already won support from a
growing body of scholars who have emphasized the essential role of
disruption in winning labor law reform.168 For example, Professor
James Atelson's comparative study of American and Canadian reform
efforts concludes that the Canadian Labor movement has been more
successful than the American Labor movement in organizing workers,
largely because of Canada's greater militancy.' 69 Similarly, Alan
Hyde and Michael Goldfarb have concluded that sharp increases in
worker unrest are usually followed by labor law reform.17
Moreover, America's experience with Civil Rights movement in the
1960s further confirms that the most effective way to overcome
"unjust" laws is through civil disobedience. 7 '
Unfortunately, Forbath quickly passes over this important
chapter in the American Labor movement. Forbath over-romanticizes
the Knights of Labor's broad social vision and argues for the
impossible, rather than examining the potential for similar class-based
civil disobedience today.

III. Conclusion
Forbath's Law and the Shaping of the American Labor

'6'Id.

at 142-47.
See Pope, supra note 79, at 488-89.
'69
Id. at 499 (citing James Atelson, The Prospectsfor LaborLaw Reform, 18 POL'Y
STUD. J.364 (1989-90)).
170 Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 445-46
(1990); Michael Goldfarb, Worker Insurgency, Radical Organization, and New Deal
Legislation, 83 AM. POL. SI. REv. 1257, 1270-73 (1989).
17'Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 67, 76-82 (1990) (discussing certain movements during the 1960s,
including protests against the Vietnam War consisting of sit-ins and road blocks, and Dr.
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Movement adds an important piece of scholarship to what was
becoming an increasingly stale debate regarding the distinctiveness of
the American Labor movement. His book provides a long needed
alternative explanation for the "uniqueness" of the American Labor
movement. Although Forbath has fully researched the effect that law
has had on the American Labor movement, he mistakenly glosses
over the most successful chapter in American labor history and
argues for a return to the social policies which have already proven
unworkable. Rather than learn from the past, Forbath seeks to repeat
it. His brilliant historical account, however, largely makes up for
this normative folly.

